纽约时报 | 特朗普放松华为禁令对5G的未来意味着什么

In an impromptu question-and-answer session late last month at the White House, President Trump was asked about the nation’s efforts to block Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company, from doing business in the United States and with our allies around the globe.

In an impromptu question-and-answer session late last month at the White House, President Trump was asked about the nation’s efforts to block Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company, from doing business in the United States and with our allies around the globe.

上月底在白宫的一个即席问答环节,特朗普总统被问到了美国阻止中国电信企业华为在美国及其全球盟友开展业务的努力。

“Huawei is something that is very dangerous,” Mr. Trump said. Then, almost in the same breath, he added: “It’s possible that Huawei would be included in a trade deal. If we made a deal, I can imagine Huawei being included in some form or some part of a trade deal.”

“华为很危险,”特朗普说。然后,几乎是同时,他又补充道:“华为有可能被纳入一项贸易协议。如果我们达成协议,我可以想像华为会以某种形式或作为贸易协议的某部分被包括进来。”

Over the weekend in Japan, Mr. Trump appeared to choose trade over national security, suspending the ban on United States companies’ supplying equipment to Huawei as he hopes to reach a trade deal with President Xi Jinping of China. Without providing any details, he declared that American companies could sell to Huawei without creating a “great, national emergency problem.”

上周末在日本,特朗普似乎选择了贸易而不是国家安全,暂停了美国企业向华为供应设备的禁令,因为他希望与中国国家主席习近平达成一项贸易协议。在未提供任何细节的情况下,他宣布,美国企业可以在不会造成“重大的国家紧急问题”的情况下向华为出售产品。

He said this even as own secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, spent the past several months traveling the world warning our allies that Huawei is a profoundly dangerous security threat and instructing them to freeze out the company.

就在他做此番表述的同时,美国国务卿迈克·庞皮欧(Mike Pompeo)过去几个月前往世界各国,警告美国的盟友华为构成了极其严重的安全威胁,并要求他们将该公司排除在外。

Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, used Twitter to call Mr. Trump’s reversal “a catastrophic mistake” that “will destroy the credibility of his administration’s warnings about the threat posed by the company, no one will ever again take them seriously.” (Mr. Trump followed the same playbook with ZTE earlier this year, banning it and then reversing the ban to placate the Chinese.)

佛罗里达州共和党参议员马尔科·卢比奥(Marco Rubio)在Twitter上称,特朗普的逆转是“一个灾难性的错误”,“将破坏他领导的政府对该公司威胁警告的可信度,以后不会有人重视这些警告了”。(今年早些时候,特朗普对中兴采取了同样的做法,先是下禁令,然后再取消以安抚中国人)

While Mr. Trump may view Huawei as both “dangerous” and a pawn in the trade war, the truth is it may be something else entirely.

特朗普可能认为华为既“危险”,又可以作为贸易战的棋子,但事实上,它可能完全是另外一回事。

Huawei is the most significant long-term competitive threat to the United States’ dominance of the future of wireless technology. And the United States is woefully — even disgracefully — behind.

华为是对美国在未来无线技术主导地位最大的、长期的竞争威胁。而美国却不幸地——甚至可以说是可耻地——落在了后面。

No matter what the United States does to hobble Huawei — and Mr. Trump’s latest stance will only hasten its rise — it will not alter a fundamental problem that clouds the conversation: The United States needs a meaningful strategy to lead the world in next-generation wireless technology — a kind of Manhattan Project for the future of connectivity.

无论美国怎么阻碍华为——而且特朗普的最新立场只会加速它的崛起——都不会改变一个笼罩在双方对话之上的基本问题:美国需要一个有意义的战略,引领世界新一代无线技术——一个面向未来网络互联的曼哈顿计划(Manhattan Project)。

Don’t take my word for it.

并不是只有我这么说。

In April, amid the frenzy over the report from Robert S. Mueller III, the special counsel investigating Russian election interference, another alarming government report was issued — and largely overlooked.

今年4月,就在调查俄罗斯干预选举的特别检察官罗伯特·S·穆勒三世(Robert S. Mueller III)的报告引发轩然大波之际,还有一份令人担忧的政府报告被发表出来,但基本上被无视了。

It was written by the Defense Innovation Board, a group of business leaders and academics that advises the Defense Department. And it was a scathing indictment of the country’s 5G efforts.

这份报告由防务创新委员会(Defense Innovation Board)起草。该委员会由商界领袖和学者组成,为国防部提供咨询。报告对美国在5G方面的作为提出了严厉批评。

“The leader of 5G stands to gain hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue over the next decade, with widespread job creation across the wireless technology sector,” wrote the board, a who’s-who of the tech world that includes the former Alphabet chairman Eric Schmidt, the LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman and Walter Isaacson, the author and a former chief executive of the Aspen Institute.

“在未来十年,5G的领导者将获得数千亿美元的收入,在无线技术领域创造广泛的就业机会,”该委员会写道。这个委员会包括字母表(Alphabet)董事会主席埃里克·施密特(Eric Schmidt)、领英(LinkedIn)创始人里德·霍夫曼(Reid Hoffman)以及阿斯彭学会(Aspen Institute)的前任首席执行官、作家沃尔特·艾萨克森(Walter Isaacson)在内的科技界大人物。

“The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world,” the board wrote.

“拥有5G的国家将拥有很多这类创新技术,并将为世界其他地区制定标准,”该委员会写道。

It added in no uncertain terms: “That country is currently not likely to be the United States.”

它还明确加了一条:“这个国家当前看来不大可能是美国。”

It is no wonder. No American company makes the devices that transmit high-speed wireless signals. Huawei is the clear leader in the field; the Swedish company Ericsson is a distant second; and the Finnish company Nokia is third.

这样的预测并不奇怪。没有一家美国公司制造传输高速无线信号的设备。华为显然是该领域的领导者;瑞典公司爱立信(Ericsson)排在第二,距第一很遥远;芬兰公司诺基亚(Nokia)位居第三。

It is almost surprising that the Defense Department allowed the report to be published at all, given the board’s remarkably blunt assessment of the nation’s lack of innovation and what it said was one of the biggest impediments to rolling out 5G in the United States: the Pentagon itself.

鉴于委员会极其直白地评价了美国的创新匮乏,并称在美国推出5G最大的障碍之一正是五角大楼,国防部允许这份报告发表本身就已经有些意外。

The board said the broadband spectrum needed to create a successful network was reserved not for commercial purposes but for the military.

委员会表示,成功搭建网络所需的宽带频谱不是为商业用途、而是为军方预留的。

To work best, 5G needs what’s called low-band spectrum, because it allows signals to travel farther than high-band spectrum. The farther the signal can travel, the less infrastructure has to be deployed.

为实现最佳的性能,5G需要人们所说的低频段频谱,因为它的信号传输比高频频谱远。信号传输越远,所需部署的基础设施就越少。

In China and even in Europe, governments have reserved low-band spectrum for 5G, making it efficient and less costly to blanket their countries with high-speed wireless connectivity. In the United States, the low-band spectrum is reserved for the military.

在中国甚至欧洲,政府已为5G预留了低频段频谱,这使得在他们国家全面实现高速无线连接效率更高、成本更低。而在美国,低频段频谱是为军方预留的。

The difference this makes is stark. Google conducted an experiment for the board, placing 5G transmitters on 72,735 towers and rooftops. Using high-band spectrum, the transmitters covered only 11.6 percent of the United States population at a speed of 100 megabits per second and only 3.9 percent at 1 gigabit per second. If the same transmitters could use low-band spectrum, 57.4 percent of the population would be covered at 100 megabits per second and 21.2 percent at 1 gigabit per second.

由此产生的差异是显著的。谷歌为委员会做了一项实验,将5G信号传送器放置在72735座塔和屋顶上面。使用高频段频谱时,传送器仅以每秒100兆比特和每秒1千兆比特的速度,分别覆盖了美国11.6和3.9%的人口。而若同样的传送器可以使用低频段频谱,则每秒100兆比特和1千兆比特的速度可分别覆盖57.4%和21.2%的人口。

In other words, the spectrum that has been allotted in the United States for commercial 5G communications makes 5G significantly slower and more expensive to roll out than just about anywhere else.

换言之,美国现已部署的商用5G通信频谱,导致5G传输速度比起其他所有地方都要慢很多,推出成本也更高昂。

That is a commercial disincentive and puts the United States at a distinct disadvantage.

这是抑制商业发展的因素,明显令美国处于不利地位。

The spectrum challenge creates a negative feedback loop for manufacturers, which may help explain why no major American technology company has jumped into the fray. But since President Trump issued an executive order that banned the purchase of equipment from companies posing a national security threat — which include Huawei — it threatens the ability of American companies to expand their 5G networks, particularly in rural areas.

这一频谱挑战给制造商造成了负反馈环,这或许可以解释为何尚未有主要美国科技公司加入这场争夺。但由于特朗普总统发布了禁止向构成国家安全威胁的公司采购设备的行政令——这其中包括华为,美国公司扩展5G网络的能力受到了威胁,特别是在农村地区。

United States phone companies like AT&T and Verizon may end up seeking to manufacture their own transmitters given the dearth of options.

由于选择有限,像AT&T和威瑞森(Verizon)这样的美国电话公司最终可能得寻求自行制造传送器。

Not winning the 5G contest comes with consequences. “If China leads the field in 5G infrastructure and systems, then the future 5G ecosystem will likely have Chinese components embedded throughout,” the Defense Innovation Board wrote. “This would pose a serious threat to the security of D.O.D. operations and networks going forward.”

赢不了5G竞赛是会有后果的。“如果中国在5G基础设施和系统领域领先,那么未来的5G生态系统可能一直都将使用内置的中国元器件,”防务创新委员会写道。“这将给今后美国国防部行动和网络的安全性构成严重威胁。”

One of the board’s recommendations is that the Defense Department share its low-band spectrum to accelerate the commercial development of the technology in the United States.

委员会的建议之一是让国防部分享它的低频段频谱,以加快美国5G技术的商业发展。

While sharing spectrum comes with its own security challenges, the board raised the prospect of some unique, surprising benefits: “Integration of government and civil use may provide a layer of security by allowing military traffic to ‘hide in plain sight’ as traffic becomes more difficult to see and isolate. Similarly, adversaries might be deterred from jamming this spectrum because they might be operating on the same bands.”

分享频谱本身虽然伴随安全上的挑战,但委员会也提出了可能会有的一些独特的、意想不到的益处:“通过让军用数据通信“隐藏在普通的场景中”,使通信变得更难看到并隔离开来,政府和民用的整合可以提供一层安全保障。同时,由于对手可能在同一频段上运行,它可能会阻止他们对这个范围进行干扰。”

None of this is meant to suggest that Huawei does not represent a national security threat if the Chinese government were to use it to spy on foreign adversaries in the future. (Though, it is worth saying, there is no evidence presented publicly by any American agency that the company’s hardware has been used that way — yet.)

这并不等于说华为不构成国家安全威胁,如果中国政府未来要用它来监视外国敌对势力的话。(虽然值得一提的是,没有任何美国机构公开出具过证据,表明这家公司的硬件曾被这样使用过——目前还没有。)

Nor should it be read as an apology for Huawei’s record of stealing intellectual property, which has been well chronicled.

同时这也不是在为华为盗窃知识产权的行为开脱,该公司在这方面的劣迹已有详细的记录。

Sharing spectrum should be only the start, however. Policymakers must grasp that the “market” in the United States isn’t working the way it should, especially when state actors like China are supporting companies like Huawei.

不过分享频谱应该只是个起点。政策制定者必须明白,美国的这一市场当前没有按应有的方式运转,特别是当中国这样的国家行为者正在支持华为这类企业之际。

If the United States is going to lead the world, Washington needs to think hard about the incentives it provides companies — not only for research and development, where we are still leading, but also for manufacturing the technology that is in our national interest to control as well as what mergers it allows.

如果美国要领导全世界,那么华盛顿需要认真思考一下它给企业提供的激励措施——不仅是在我们仍领先的研发方面,也在于我们的国家利益所要求控制的技术制造方面,以及哪些并购行为是在可允许的范围内。

One morning in late February, Mr. Trump typed out a message on Twitter: “I want the United States to win through competition, not by blocking out currently more advanced technologies.”

2月底的一个早晨,特朗普发了一条推文:“我想让美国通过竞争胜出,而不是禁止目前更先进的技术。”

That is a worthy goal, and an achievable one. But it requires more than the Band-Aid solution that is a trade deal or a blacklist. It requires a new strategy.

这是一项值得追求的目标,也是可以实现的目标。但它需要不止于贸易协议或黑名单这种“创可贴”式的解决方案。它需要一项新的战略。

Maybe we’ll have one in time for 6G.

也许我们能赶在6G到来前制定出来。

Andrew Ross Sorkin是交易录(DealBook)的专栏作家、创始人和特约编辑。他是CNBC节目《财经论谈》(Squawk Box)的共同主播和《Too Big to Fail》的作者。他也是Showtime剧集《Billions》的共同创作者。欢迎在Twitter和Facebook上关注他。
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