纽约时报 | 特朗普该怎么打与中国和伊朗的两场仗?

If you’re keeping score at home on the Trump foreign policy, let me try to put it in a nutshell: The president has engaged America in a grand struggle to reshape the modern behavior of two of the world’s oldest civilizations — Persia and China — at the same time.

If you’re keeping score at home on the Trump foreign policy, let me try to put it in a nutshell: The president has engaged America in a grand struggle to reshape the modern behavior of two of the world’s oldest civilizations — Persia and China — at the same time.

如果你在给特朗普的外交政策打分,我来做个简要概括:总统已经让美国参与进了一场重大斗争中,目的是同时去重塑世界上最古老的两个文明——波斯和中国——在现代社会的行为。

Pressing both to change is not crazy. What’s crazy is the decision to undertake such a huge endeavor without tightly defined goals, without allies to achieve those goals, without a strong and coherent national security team and without a plan on how to sync up all of President Trump’s competing foreign policy objectives.

迫使它们改变本身不疯狂。疯狂之处在于,没有严格界定的目标,没有帮忙实现这些目标的盟友,没有一个强大、一致的国家安全团队,没有想清楚如何让特朗普总统这些彼此间存在竞争的外交政策目标保持同步,就开始了一个如此重大的行动。

After all, Trump is unilaterally breaking the 2015 denuclearization deal with Iran’s dictator while trying to entice North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, into a denuclearization deal that he’s supposed to trust the U.S. president will honor. Trump is sanctioning China on trade while trying to enlist its help to denuclearize North Korea. Trump is imposing steel and aluminum tariffs on America’s European allies while needing their help to confront China on trade and Iran on nukes.

毕竟,特朗普正在单方面地打破与伊朗的独裁者于2015年定下的无核化协议,同时,还在试图引诱朝鲜的独裁者金正恩,想让他达成一个无核化协议,并使他相信美国总统会履行这个协议。特朗普正在贸易上制裁中国,同时,也在试图寻求中国在朝鲜实现无核化方面的帮助。特朗普正在对美国的欧洲盟友实施钢铝关税,同时,又在需要他们在贸易和核武器上,在对抗中国和伊朗方面伸出援手。

And last week Trump came within 10 minutes of bombing Iran — but wisely pulled back — in retaliation for its shooting down of a U.S. drone, at a time when we cannot stabilize Iraq, or get out of Afghanistan without leaving chaos behind, absent the cooperation of Iran.

此外,上周,特朗普差10分钟就要轰炸伊朗了——但明智地撤回了决定——为的是报复该国击落一架美国无人机,然而目前的情况是,我们要想让伊拉克稳定下来,想撤出阿富汗但又不让这个国家陷入混乱,就必须有伊朗的合作。

But we are where we are, and I will give Trump credit for one thing: He has imposed real pain on Iran — virtually choking off all of its oil production through sanctions — and on China — with $250 billion of tariffs on its exports to the U.S. and a total ban on products from its biggest telecom equipment company, Huawei. In short, Trump has created real leverage for transactional or transformational deals with both countries.

但这就是我们现在的处境了,而且有一点我得肯定特朗普:他对伊朗造成了真正的痛苦——通过制裁基本上掐断了伊朗所有的石油生产——对中国也是——对该国向美国出口的2500亿美元商品征收关税,并且对最大的电信设备公司华为下达全面产品禁令。总而言之,特朗普已经创造了真正有份量的砝码,可以用来与这两个国家达成交易性或转型性的协议。

A president who acts just a little crazy can be good at times. Who else would have squeezed Beijing and Tehran this hard and at once? But a president who acts a lot crazy — who creates pain without clear goals, who always insists on being seen to win and the other guy being seen to lose, with no compromise escape route — is not good.

一个行事略微有些疯狂的总统有时候是好事。还有谁能在同一时间如此重地挤压北京和德黑兰?但一个行事很疯狂的总统——只是在创造痛苦却没有明确目标;总是坚持要显得是赢家,让另一个人显得是输了,没有一个妥协的后路——就不太妙了。

Does Trump want regime change in Iran or just a change of behavior? Does he want to shrink the trade deficit with China or just get fair access for our companies? It’s not clear to me and doesn’t seem clear to him.

特朗普是想要伊朗政权更迭,还只是想要其行为发生改变?他是想要缩小与中国的贸易逆差,还是只是想为我们的公司获得公平的市场准入?我搞不清楚,他似乎也搞不清楚。

The big question is can the president be disciplined enough, patient enough and deft enough — cue the skepticism — to translate the pain he’s imposed on them into specific, tangible and lasting gains for America?

重要的问题是,总统能否能有足够的自律,有足够的耐心和足够机智——值得怀疑——将他对两个国家施加的痛苦转化为对美国来说明确、切实且长久的利益?

Because China and Iran are two very different problems. China makes real stuff of value, while Iran makes real trouble of concern.

因为中国和伊朗是两个截然不同的问题,中国能制造出真正有价值的东西,伊朗则能制造出真正让人担忧的麻烦。

China has its eye on dominating the two most important industries of the 21st century: artificial intelligence and electric cars. It intends to use A.I. to perfect its authoritarian control at home and electric cars and batteries to liberate itself from dependence on the “old oil” of the last century. China knows that data is the “new oil,” so the country whose government and companies can capture the most data, analyze it and optimize it will be the superpower of this century.

中国着眼于主导21世纪最为重要的两个行业:人工智能和电动汽车。中国意图利用人工智能在国内完善其威权主义控制,利用电动汽车和电池解放其对上个世纪的“老石油”的依赖。中国知道数据是“新石油”,因此一个国家的政府和公司如果能够捕捉到最多数据、对其进行分析,充分利用这些数据,那就将是这个世纪的超级大国。

Iran, by contrast, is led by a narrow-minded, aging cleric who’s been focused on acquiring the most important technology of the 20th century, nuclear weaponry, to help it dominate its region, push the U.S. out and win a struggle with the Sunni Arabs over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad from the seventh century — Shiites or Sunnis. In the process, Iran’s clerical leaders are suppressing a hugely talented and culturally rich people, blocking them from realizing their full potential.

与此形成对比的是伊朗,这个国家由一个思想狭隘、年岁渐长的宗教领袖领导,他的主要注意力都放在了20世纪最为重要的技术——核武器上,来帮助该国称霸该地区,将美国排挤出去,并且赢得一场与逊尼派阿拉伯人的争斗:谁是七世纪先知穆罕默德的正当继承人——什叶派还是逊尼派?在这个过程中,伊朗的神职领导层正在压迫一群才华横溢、文化底蕴丰厚的人民,让他们无法发挥其全部潜力。

Iran is also relying almost entirely on selling the oil that powered the 20th century — crude oil. Good luck with that. America is now the world’s largest oil producer — not Saudi Arabia, Russia or Iran. If Iran sinks oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, it will create gasoline lines in China, not America.

此外,伊朗几乎完全依赖驱动了20世纪的油——原油——的销售。这就只能祝他们好运了。如今全世界最大的产油国并非沙特阿拉伯、俄罗斯或伊朗,而是美国。如果伊朗在波斯湾击沉运油船,出现汽油供应紧张的会是中国而不是美国。

For all of these reasons, we can settle for a transactional deal with Iran, but we need a transformational deal with China.

鉴于这些原因,我们可以勉强接受一项与伊朗的交易性协议,但我们需要与中国达成一项转型性协议。

If Trump is smart, he’ll quickly use his leverage to strike a limited deal with Iran. With our reduced exposure to the Middle East today, we have no interest in getting embroiled in a war with Tehran, let alone engineering its “obliteration,” as Trump threatened if Iran hits U.S. forces in the region.

如果特朗普聪明些的话,他就会迅速利用自己手中的砝码,与伊朗达成一项有限协议。由于我们如今在中东减少了存在,卷入一场与德黑兰的战争对我们毫无益处,更不要说要像特朗普威胁的那样,如果伊朗在该地区打击美国部队,他会采取行动将这个国家“夷为平地”。

Trump should invite Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China — our partners in the 2015 Obama-Iran nuclear deal that Trump tore up — to join us in improving that deal with a simple offer: The U.S. will lift oil sanctions if Tehran agrees to extend the restrictions on its ability to make a nuclear bomb from the original 15 years to 30 years, and agrees to a ban on testing Iranian missiles that can reach beyond the Middle East.

特朗普应当邀请英国、法国、德国、俄罗斯和中国——这些国家在被特朗普撕毁的2015年奥巴马-伊朗核协议中是我们的合作伙伴——加入我们,用一个简单的提议改善该协议:将限制德黑兰制造核弹的年限从原本的15年延长至30年,如果德黑兰同意该条件,并且同意一项禁令——禁止伊朗试验可远及中东以外地区的导弹——美国将解除制裁。

Keeping Iran and the Arab states away from nuclear weapons for another couple decades would be a good achievement. It could be a simple transaction — easy to verify and one that our allies could sign on to, as well as China and Russia. Iran, given the economic pain it is under, would have a very hard time saying no.

让伊朗和阿拉伯国家再远离核武器几十年会是一个很好的成就。它可以是个很简单的交易——很容易验证,也是我们的盟友能同意的,中国和俄罗斯也可以。考虑到伊朗目前承受的经济痛苦,该国将很难说不。

Then we could sit back and let transformation emerge from within Iran, the only place it can emerge from, through its own people, who deserve better and eventually will get rid of this suffocating, rotten regime. Yes, it may take years, but we outsiders can’t rush Iranian history. Trying to force regime change on Iran right now could unleash disorder and refugees of massive proportions there.

这样一来,我们就可以放松下来,让改革在伊朗内部显现出来,改革只能从这里发源,通过他们自己的人民,他们理应得到更好的对待,并且最终会摆脱这种令人窒息的、腐坏的政权。没错,这可能会经过很多年,但我们这些局外人不能催促伊朗的历史进程。试图强迫伊朗政权立刻更替,将会让那里出现大量的骚乱和难民。

Once we have Iran’s nuclear program curtailed for 30 years, our coldblooded interest is not to get any more deeply embroiled in this region’s pathologies. Israel can take care of itself. And we can arm the Sunni Arabs to keep Iran at bay. Sure, Iran is a bad actor, but Saudi Arabia murdered, dismembered and apparently boiled in acid the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and it’s been jailing women who pushed for driving rights.

一旦我们将伊朗核计划冻结30年 ,从一种冷血的角度讲,我们的利益就不再是更深地卷入这个地区地混乱中了。以色列能照顾好自己。我们可以给逊尼派阿拉伯人武装,牵制伊朗。没错,伊朗是一个糟糕的行为者,但沙特阿拉伯谋杀、肢解了记者贾迈勒·卡舒吉(Jamal Khashoggi),并且似乎是将尸体用酸液溶解了,此外该国还会把倡导驾车权利的女性投入监狱。

The insight of Karim Sadjadpour, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment, should always be kept top of mind: “America has bad enemies in the Middle East. It also has bad allies.”

我们应当铭记卡内基研究院(Carnegie Endowment)中东专家卡里姆·萨德杰普尔(Karim Sadjadpour)的洞见:“美国在中东有糟糕的敌人。还有糟糕的盟友。”

China poses a much more profound challenge. Quite simply, China grew out of poverty using a strategy of hard work, delayed gratification, smart investments in infrastructure and education and big investments in research and manufacturing the innovations of others. Alongside those, China also stole others’ intellectual property, forced technology transfers from companies doing business there, imposed nonreciprocal trade arrangements, provided huge government subsidies to its exporters and ignored World Trade Organization rulings.

中国构成的挑战要难解得多。简单来说,中国能走出贫困,靠的是刻苦工作,暂不享乐,在基础设施建设、教育方面的明智投资,以及投入大量资金去研究和生产他人的创新成果。在这样做的过程中,中国还盗窃他国知识产权,强迫在中国做生意的公司进行技术转让,实施非互惠性贸易协议,向本国出口商提供大量政府补贴,并且无视世界贸易组织的裁决。

If we were to allow China to use those same abusive practices it employed to dominate the manufacturing and assembly of low-margin, high-volume goods to now compete directly with us for the high-value-added, high-margin technologies of the 21st century — like 5G telecom, new materials, AI, aerospace, microchips — we’d be crazy.

中国利用这些不正当手段主导了低利润、大批量商品的生产和组装,如今能直接与我们在21世纪的高附加值、高利润技术方面竞争,例如5G电信、新材料、人工智能、航空航天、微芯片。如果我们要允许中国继续这种不正当手段,那我们就是疯了。

But China’s current growth model — both its strengths and abuses — is central to keeping the Communist Party in power. It’s not something Beijing will abandon easily. That is why I believe the market is underestimating how difficult it will be to strike any transformational deal that gets China to fully abandon its abuses. And a small transactional deal won’t cut it.

但中国目前的增长模式——包括它的长处和它的不正当——对于维护共产党的当权来说至关重要。这不是北京会轻易放弃的东西。这就是为什么我认为,市场没有充分认识到,与中国达成任何转型性协议,让中国完全摒弃其不正当行为,有多么困难。而一个小规模的转型性协议是达不到效果的。

And that’s why I also keep saying: This is no ordinary moment. This is the big one, folks. What’s at stake with Trump and China is what kind of global economy we’re going to have going forward. What’s at stake with Iran is what kind of global nuclear nonproliferation regime we’re going to have going forward.

并且,这也是为什么我一直在说:这不是普通的时刻。这是一个重大时刻,朋友们。对特朗普和中国而言,此刻关系到我们在将来会有怎样一种全球经济。而与伊朗的问题关系到将来会有怎样一个全球核不扩散体制。

The stakes simply could not be bigger, which is why I believe 2019 will be a pivotal year — like 1945 and 1989. I just hope it ends as well.

这些将产生极为重大的影响,这也是为什么我认为,2019将是关键一年——就像是1945年或是1989年。我但求最终也能有同样的结果。

托马斯·L·弗里德曼(Thomas L. Friedman)是外交事务方面的专栏作者。他1981年加入时报,曾三次获得普利策奖。他著有七本书,包括赢得国家图书奖的《从贝鲁特到耶路撒冷》(From Beirut to Jerusalem)。欢迎在Twitter @tomfriedman和Facebook上关注他。
翻译:Annie
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