这场美中“战争”究竟要走向何方?

Sign up for NYT Chinese-language Morning Briefing.[欢迎点击此处、或发送邮件至cn.letters@nytimes.com订阅《纽约时报》中文简报。]

(・👅・) 如果小站对你有帮助,看文章的时候,帮忙点一下公众号文章最底部的 广告 吧 (๑•̀ㅂ•́)و✧
      每日有效点一次,无需下载or关注,点一下就行的

SINGAPORE — One of the most negative byproducts of the Trump presidency is that all we talk about now is Donald Trump. Don’t get me wrong: How can we not be fixated on a president who daily undermines the twin pillars of our democracy: truth and trust?

新加坡——特朗普总统任期最负面的副产品之一,是我们现在谈论的都是唐纳德·特朗普。不要误解我的意思:一个每天都在破坏我们民主制度的两大支柱——事实与信任——的总统,我们怎能不去关注他?

But there are some tectonic changes underway behind the Trump noise machine that demand a serious national discussion, like the future of U.S.-China relations. Yet it’s not happening — because all we talk about is Donald Trump.

但在特朗普噪音机器背后,正在发生一些结构性变化,需要进行严肃的全国性讨论,比如美中关系的未来。但这并没有发生——因为我们现在谈论的都是唐纳德·特朗普。

Consider this: On Nov. 9, European leaders gathered in Berlin to mark the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was an anniversary worth celebrating. But no one seemed to notice that almost exactly 30 years after the Berlin Wall fell, a new wall — a digital Berlin Wall — had begun to be erected between China and America. And the only thing left to be determined, a Chinese business executive remarked to me, “is how high this wall will be,” and which countries will choose to be on which side.

想想看:11月9日,欧盟领导人齐聚柏林,纪念柏林墙倒塌30周年。那是个值得庆祝的周年纪念日。但似乎没人注意到,几乎恰好在柏林墙倒塌30年后,一堵新的墙——数字柏林墙——开始在中美之间竖立起来。一名中国企业高管曾对我说,唯一有待确定的,“是这堵墙会有多高,以及哪些国家将选择站在哪一边。”

This new wall, separating a U.S.-led technology and trade zone from a Chinese-led one, will have implications as vast as the wall bisecting Berlin did. Because the peace, prosperity and accelerations in technology and globalization that have so benefited the world over the past 40 years were due, in part, to the interweaving of the U.S. and Chinese economies.

这堵新墙将美国主导的技术和贸易区域与中国主导的区域分隔开来,其影响之大,将不亚于将柏林一分为二的那堵墙。因为过去40年来,令全世界受益匪浅的和平、繁荣以及技术和全球化的加速,部分是由于美中两个经济体的相互交织。

The messy, ad hoc decoupling of these two economies, driven by miscalculations by leaders on both sides, will surely disrupt those trends and the costs could be huge. We might want to talk about that.

受双方领导人误判的影响,两个经济体出现了混乱、没有准备的脱钩,这无疑将破坏上述趋势,并可能带来巨大的代价。我们也许应该谈谈这个。

Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson gave a speech here a year ago trying to kick-start that discussion. “For 40 years,” Paulson noted, “the U.S.-China relationship has been characterized by the integration of four things: goods, capital, technology and people. And over these 40 years, economic integration between the two countries was supposed to mitigate security competition. But an intellectually honest appraisal must now admit both that this hasn’t happened and that the reverse is taking place.”

一年前,前财政部长汉克·保尔森(Hank Paulson)曾在这里发表演讲,试图开启这番讨论。“40年来,”保尔森指出,“美中关系的特点一直是四项事务的融合:商品、资本、技术和人员。这40年间,两国之间的经济融合本应减轻安全方面的竞争。但如果在智识层面上做出如实的判断,现在必须承认,这种情况并没有发生,相反的情况正在发生。”

That reversal is happening for two reasons. First, because the U.S. is — rightly — no longer willing to accept China’s unfair trade restrictions on importing of U.S. goods and its stealing of the intellectual property of U.S. firms — something we tolerated for many years before China became a technology powerhouse.

相反情况的发生有两点原因。其一,因为美国——理所当然地——不愿再接受中国对美国商品的不公平贸易限制及其从美国公司窃取知识产权的做法——这是我们在中国成为科技大国之前的许多年间所一直容忍的。

And second, because, now that China is a technology powerhouse — and technological products all have both economic and military applications, unlike the toys, T-shirts and tennis shoes that used to dominate our trade — the two sides are struggling to figure out what to buy and sell from and to each other, without damaging their national security.

其二,因为既然中国已是科技大国——并且科技产品都有经济和军事上的应用,不比从前主导我们贸易的玩具、T恤和网球鞋——双方正努力弄明白要从对方那里购买和出售什么,才不至于损害自身的国家安全。

The net result, argued Paulson, is that “after 40 years of integration, a surprising number of political and thought leaders on both sides advocate policies that could forcibly de-integrate the two countries across all four of these baskets.” And if that trend continues, “we need to consider the possibility that the integration of global innovation ecosystems will collapse as a result of mutual efforts by the United States and China to exclude one another.”

保尔森认为,最终的结果是“在经过了40年的融合后,双方的政治和思想领袖中,有相当一部分人在倡导将迫使两国在所有四项事务上进行脱离的政策”。而如果这一趋势继续下去,“我们需要考虑这样的可能性,即全球创新生态系统的融合将因美国和中国互相排斥的做法而崩溃。”

That, Paulson concluded, is “why I now see the prospect of an Economic Iron Curtain — one that throws up new walls on each side and unmakes the global economy, as we have known it.” Yikes!

保尔森总结称,这便是“为何我现在看到经济数字铁幕的可能性——在每一边都竖起新的墙,并破坏我们所知道的全球经济”。麻烦了!

One could argue that a digital Berlin Wall began rising years ago when China created its Great Firewall to seal off the internet inside China from the global internet — so Beijing could censor all news and online internal discussions, freezing out Google, Facebook and Twitter. China, as well as other countries, has also begun ring-fencing certain data pools, software and technology stacks to make sure that all of them, or at least key elements, are stored on domestic servers and not accessible from abroad.

有人可能会说,数字柏林墙多年前就已经竖起,当时中国筑起防火长城,把中国国内互联网和全球互联网隔离开来——这样北京可以审查所有新闻和在线内部讨论,屏蔽谷歌、Facebook和Twitter。与其他国家一样,中国也开始对某些数据池、软件和技术栈进行隔离,以确保所有这些数据,或至少关键元素都存储在国内服务器上,不能从国外访问。

But the digital Berlin Wall took a big step up on May 17, when Trump placed China’s Huawei — the world’s second-largest maker of smartphones and the world’s largest manufacturer of 5G telecom equipment — on the U.S. “Entity List.”

但5月17日,当特朗普把中国的华为——世界第二大智能手机制造商及世界最大的5G电信设备制造商——列入美国的“实体清单”,数字柏林墙加高了一大截。

That meant that China’s most important technology manufacturer and scores of its affiliates across the globe were blacklisted and could no longer buy parts from their major U.S. suppliers — such as Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Micron and Microsoft — without a special license. U.S. officials argued that Huawei was guilty of facilitating Chinese espionage — or would do so in the future if China’s government asked it to — and had engaged in fraud, technology theft and violations on U.S. sanctions against Iran.

这意味着,中国最重要的科技制造商及其全球各地几十家附属公司被列入黑名单,无法再从主要的美国供应商那里购买零部件——如谷歌、高通(Qualcomm)、英特尔(Intel)、美光(Micron)和微软——除非有特殊的许可证。美国官员认为,华为犯有帮中国从事间谍活动的罪行——或者将来会应中国政府的要求这么做——并涉嫌欺诈、技术盗窃和违反美国对伊朗的制裁禁令。

However much justified, this move was the equivalent of China freezing out Apple and Microsoft. In was an earthquake in China’s tech lands. It “woke up everybody in China,” a prominent Chinese telecom executive told me. “We now have to think about this world differently,” the executive explained. “We need to build on a mix of our own technologies to be sure that we are safe. They totally underestimated what they have done.”

不管这样做理由多么充分,这一举动相当于中国将苹果和微软(Microsoft)排挤出去。这在中国的科技领域引发了地震。它“唤醒了中国的每一个人”,一位著名的中国电信高管告诉我。“我们现在必须以不同的方式思考这个世界,”这位高管解释说。“我们需要结合我们自己的技术来确保我们的安全。他们完全低估了自己所做的事情。”

Lots of Chinese tech companies are now thinking: We will never, ever, ever leave ourselves again in a situation where we are totally dependent on America for key components. Time to double down on making our own.

许多中国科技公司现在都在想:我们再也不会、再也不会、再也不会让自己陷入完全依赖美国提供关键零部件的境地。是时候加倍努力了。

At the same time, U.S. manufacturers are saying to themselves: We’d better think twice about building our next factory in China or solely depending on a supply chain from there.

与此同时,美国制造商也在对自己说:是不是还要在中国建下一家工厂,或者仅仅依靠那里的供应链?我们最好三思而后行。

The ripping sound you hear is the sound of two giant economies starting to decouple.

你听到的撕裂声,是两个经济大国开始脱钩的声音。

And now that tear is moving to people. Since June 11, the State Department has been restricting visas for Chinese graduate students studying in sensitive fields — like aviation, robotics and advanced manufacturing — to one year, instead of five years. There has also been a crackdown on Chinese investments in anything close to American infrastructure or military-related industries.

而现在,这种撕裂正在转向人。自6月11日以来,美国国务院已经将航空、机器人和先进制造等敏感领域的中国研究生的签证限制为一年,而不是五年。此外,任何接近美国基础设施或军事相关行业的中国投资也遭到了打压。

On June 25, M.I.T.’s president, L. Rafael Reif, warned the M.I.T. community that “looking at cases across the nation, small numbers of researchers of Chinese background may indeed have acted in bad faith, but they are the exception and very far from the rule. Yet faculty members, post-docs, research staff and students tell me that, in their dealings with government agencies, they now feel unfairly scrutinized, stigmatized and on edge — because of their Chinese ethnicity alone.”

6月25日,麻省理工的校长L·拉斐尔·赖夫(L. Rafael Reif)警告麻省理工学院的学生们说,“从全国各地的案例来看,少数有中国背景的研究人员可能确实有恶意行动,但他们是例外,远远不是多数。然而,教职员工、博士后、研究人员和学生告诉我,在与政府机构打交道时,他们现在感到受到了不公平的审视,受到了侮辱,感到紧张不安——仅仅因为他们是华裔。”

Protracted visa delays and “harsh rhetoric against most immigrants,” Reif added, are sending a message that “the U.S. is closing the door — that we no longer seek to be a magnet for the world’s most driven and creative individuals.”

赖夫还说,长期的签证延误和“针对大多数移民的严厉措辞”发出了这样一个信息,即“美国正在关闭大门——我们不再寻求成为磁石,吸引世界上最具动力和创造力的个人”。

Over dinner last week in Bangalore, India, with a group of young Indian tech starter-uppers, I heard this message: The number of people who want to stay in India and work on local start-ups versus going to the U.S. has sharply increased in the last two years. And many of those who do go abroad now prefer Canada and Australia over America. We will pay a price for that over time.

上周在印度班加罗尔与一群年轻的印度科技创业者共进晚餐时,我听到了这样的信息:在过去两年中,想留在印度为当地初创企业工作,而不是去美国的人大幅增加。许多出国的人现在更喜欢加拿大和澳大利亚,而不是美国。随着时间的推移,我们将为此付出代价。

This decoupling is not all Trump’s fault — not by a long shot. China’s president, Xi Jinping, also overplayed his hand, taking over islands in the South China Sea, announcing plans to invest massive amounts so China can dominate critical technologies of the 21st century, tightening Communist Party rule over Hong Kong, sending Muslims in Western China to “re-education” camps and resisting pressures to reduce China’s most abusive trade practices.

这种脱钩并不全是特朗普的错——绝对不是。中国国家主席习近平也很不自量力,占领南海岛屿;宣布计划投资大量令中国可以主宰21世纪的关键技术;加强共产党对香港的统治;把中国西部的穆斯林送进“再教育”营;抵抗旨在减少中国最严重贸易滥用行为的压力。

The country benefited tremendously from the globalization system that the U.S. and its allies built since World War II, but Beijing has often been grudging about making any sacrifices to maintain it.

中国从美国及其盟友自二战以来建立的全球化体系中获益良多,但北京常常不愿做出任何牺牲来维持这一体系。

Speaking broadly about America’s role in the world versus China’s, a senior Indian diplomat remarked: “America has been fighting without winning for 20 years. China has been winning without fighting for 20 years.”

在谈到美国与中国在世界上的角色时,一位印度高级外交官评论道:“美国已经打了20年的仗,却没有取得胜利。20年来,中国一直是不战而胜。”

All this has fed a backlash in the U.S., where even Democrats are now supporting Trump’s hard line on China. “There’s a very quiet debate in China in the party on who lost America,” Jim McGregor, chairman of APCO Worldwide for greater China, said during the recent Times DealBook conference discussion on China. “The extreme direction China has gone has really pushed America away.”

所有这些都在美国引发了反弹,即使是民主党人现在也支持特朗普对中国的强硬立场。“在中国,党内有一场关于谁失去了美国的悄声辩论,”安可顾问公司(APCO Worldwide)大中华区主席麦健陆(Jim McGregor)最近在《纽约时报》交易录(DealBook)大会上谈到中国时表示:“中国走的极端路线真的把美国推开了。”

What to do?

该怎么做?

I am not blasé about letting China sell technologies in America that might be used for espionage, but I am increasingly of the view that everyone spies on everyone — and always will. I am increasingly of the view that while surely some Chinese students are engaged in espionage, a vast majority are not, and their talents nourish our industries and schools. And I am increasingly worried that by imposing more and more export and visa controls we will be cutting ourselves off from the access we need to the global investment pools, customers and collaborative scientists and engineers to maintain our technological lead.

我并不是想放任中国向美国出售可能被用于间谍活动的技术,但我越来越认为,大家都在互相监视——而且永远都是这样。我越来越认为,虽然肯定有一些中国学生从事间谍活动,但绝大多数人没有,他们的才能滋养了我们的行业和学校。我越来越担心,通过实施越来越多的出口和签证控制,我们将切断自己与全球投资池、客户、合作科学家和工程师之间的联系,而我们需要这些联系来保持我们的技术领先地位。

I still believe that the most open systems win — they get all the signals of change first, they attract the most high-I.Q. risk-takers/innovators and they enrich and are enriched by the most global flows of talent, ideas and capital. That used to be us.

我仍然相信,最开放的体系会是赢家——这些体系最早获得所有变化的信号,它们可以吸引智商最高的冒险者与创新者,他们因全球最大规模的人才、创意和资本流动而变得富有。那曾经是我们。

We need to pause and ask ourselves exactly where we are heading with this whole tech/trade war with China. And Beijing needs to do the same.

我们需要停下来问问自己,在这场与中国的科技/贸易战争中,我们究竟要走向何方。北京也需要这样做。

China is our economic competitor, economic partner, source of talent and capital, geopolitical rival, collaborator and serial rule-breaker. It is not our enemy or our friend.

中国是我们的经济竞争对手、经济伙伴、人才和资本来源、地缘政治对手、合作者和一系列规则的破坏者。它不是我们的敌人,也不是我们的朋友。

The only effective way to manage a relationship this complex is: 1) with an all-of-government approach. You can’t have the Justice Department doing one thing, the Pentagon another, the Treasury another, the trade negotiators another, the State Department another and the president tweeting another. There has to be a tightly coordinated strategy to get the best out of this relationship and cushion the worst. And 2), we need as many Pacific and European allies as possible so it’s “The Whole World Versus China” on the right rules for trade and technology integration in the 21st century, not just Trump versus Xi over who has the biggest tariff.

处理这种复杂关系的唯一有效方法是:1、采用整个政府合作的方式。你不能让司法部做一件事,让五角大楼做另一件事,让财政部做另一件事,让贸易谈判人员做另一件事,让国务院做另一件事,让总统在Twitter上发布另一件事。必须有一个紧密协调的战略,才能从这种关系中得到最好的结果,并为最坏的结果提供缓冲。2、我们需要尽可能多的太平洋和欧洲盟友,这样在21世纪贸易和技术整合的正确规则上,就会出现“全世界对抗中国”的情况,而不仅仅是特朗普和习近平较量谁的关税最高。

Unfortunately, Trump has deployed a totally disjointed, impulsive “America First” strategy that has ended up “America Alone” — and weaker. And Xi has been no better. So a relationship that the world needs to work, to drive growth and deal with global problems like climate change, is slowly unraveling. We will miss it when it’s gone.

不幸的是,特朗普采取了一种完全不连贯而又冲动的“美国优先”战略,结果是“美国孤立无援”——而且更加脆弱。习近平的表现也好不到哪里去。因此,世界需要合作、推动增长、应对气候变化等全球性问题的关系正在慢慢瓦解。当它消失时,我们会怀念它。

Or, as Kishore Mahbubani, the Singaporean academic, former diplomat and author of the forthcoming book “Has China Won?” said to me: “I wonder if one day future historians will look back at this contest between Americans and Chinese and compare them to two families of apes fighting with each other while the forest around them is burning.”

或者,正如新加坡学者、前外交官、即将出版的《中国赢了吗?》(Has China Won?)一书的作者马凯硕(Kishore Mahbubani)对我说的:“我不知道将来的历史学家回顾这次美中竞争时,是不是会把它们比作两个猿猴的族群,在周围的森林被烧毁时还在互相争斗。”

托马斯·L·弗里德曼(Thomas L. Friedman)是外交事务方面的专栏作者。他1981年加入时报,曾三次获得普利策奖。他著有七本书,包括赢得国家图书奖的《从贝鲁特到耶路撒冷》(From Beirut to Jerusalem)。欢迎在Twitter @tomfriedman和Facebook上关注他。
翻译:纽约时报中文网
点击查看本文英文版。

文章来源于:纽约时报中文网

本文由 语料中国 作者:Tmxchina 发表,其版权均为 语料中国 所有,文章内容系作者个人观点,不代表 语料中国 对观点赞同或支持。如需转载,请注明文章来源。
0

发表评论